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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
GENEVA LUMBER COMPANY, 
Appellant~ 
vs. 
PAYNE AND DAY~ INC.~ a. 
oorptJra tion ~ 
Respondent 
CASE 
NO. 0075 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
STATEliENT OF FACTS 
This case arose out of a series of contracts whereby 
appellant rmdertook to provide ce~in building ·materials 
to re9p0lldent in construction of sixty~one ~houses in Orem 
and Provop Utah. (Exhibits 6 to 11). An exam-ination of 
th-ese exhibits shows that under these contracts appellant 
was to provide certain specified amounts of named mate. 
rialsr They were not -contracts to provide an the materials 
necessary for the cons truc"tion of the3e houses~ 
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All contracts contain the following or similar provi-
sion: '•It ls mutually agreed that any additions or dele-
tions in the materials to be furnished axe to be given in 
writing by party of the second part (respondent) to party 
of the first part {appellant} t and the value of the changeJ 
based upon prices quoted in the attached listj shall either 
be added or subtracted from the original contract.n 
This action was brought· to recover for materials not 
named in the contract but delivered to the projects, and 
for amOWlts of materials deli:vered in excess of q~tities 
named in those contracts. For convenience throughoot the 
trial of the case those items delivered but not named in the 
contract were referred to as uext:ras"'l' and those items 
named in tfle contract, ~but for which the awellant. claims 
an excess over and alxlve the amounts thus named was de-
livered are called 't overagesH. Ttrls designation is follO"Wed 
here~ It is agreed that none of tb~ extras or overages 
were orden:xl in writing by: respondent. Appellant's throry 
is that this provision contained in these ron tracts \\Tas ei 1her 
waivedt modified, or that the defendant is estopped to as-
sert such defense. 
When the appeJlant rested, the respondent moved to 
disrrtiss (R.. 26~ Tr+ 478).. The trial court granted the mo. 
tion and entered an order of dismissal. This appeal is taken 
from that order . 
It is observed that in entering that order, the trial court 
did not make findings of fact and conclusions of law as 
provided by Rule 41 (b). U~ R C. P. \''e believe the rule 
in thi .s jurisdiction to be that~ in ruling upon a motion for 
nonsuit at the end of plain tiff's case t and in review-ing the 
granting of such motion. the trial court and appellate court 
wi II assume that aJJ facts and 1egi tlmate jnferences that 
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can be deduced therefrom arising from plaintiffs evidence 
\Vill be taken as true. 1\olartin v. stevens, Utah 
-~' 243 P. 2d 747; \Villiam v. Z. C~ M. L, 6 Utah 2d 
283, 312 P .. 2d 564; Winchester v. Egan Farm Servioo,. Inc., 
4 Utah 2d 129, 288 P. 2d 79(1.. We present our facts in light 
of that rule~ 
Appellant first engaged in transactions \vith respond-
ent~ through its agent, Mr. C. E~ Slavens~ in Januaryf 1957 
(Tr. 283). At that time Mr .. Davis, through negotiations 
Vlith Mr. Slavens, submitted bids for providing materials 
for construction of the first series of houses involved in this 
action (Tr+ 284ff). Through these ·bids, the parties entered 
mto a contract for the appellant to ·provide the •materials 
named in the contract, at the prices therein specified (Exh~ 
6). Subsequently through the spring and summer of 1957, 
the parties entered into ft. ve additional contracts similar 
in form, to provide materials for a total o£ sixty-one houses 
(Exh.'s 7 to 11). 
Early in the course of performance of the contracts 
appellant learned that more and different materials were 
being ordered and delivered than called for in the contract 
(Tr. 80) ~ He took this up with responde-nt's superintendent, 
and wa.s assured that the latter would take this up with 
!\lr. Payne or Mr. Day, the Hpowersn in the corporate re--
spondent, and that unless appellant heard otherwise, writ· 
te-n orders would not be necessary (Tr. 299). He did not 
hear otherv.rise. Respondentts superintendent even joined 
in setting up the manner of keeping track of the extras and 
overages (Tr+ 353). 
Appellant ·began to bill responde-nt for these extras 
and overages~ but the billing v..·ac:; returned by respo·nden t's 
superintendentt with the exhortation that this shouJd not 
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be donet as it confused the corporate officers, but that the 
partiet; should keep track of such extras and overages, and 
that appellant and respondent's superintendent would get 
together at the end _of the projects and settle up (Tr .. 351 ... 
354) I 
Accordingly~ at the end of construction appellant de-
termined he was owed $7:r751.79 for these overages and 
extras, billed the respondent therefor, but was refused any 
payment at all (Tr. 356-357). This action tvas brought 
.to recover such -sum . 
. As. stated~ there were no findings of fact or conclu-
·sions of law, although these were not 'vaived. The issues 
must,. therefore~ be determined from the course of the trial 
Because this is an appeal from a non-suit, we believe it 
mu·st be taken as fact that materials to the value stated, 
not included in the contracts!' were delivered to respcndent 
and were not paid forl' and that they were delivered at the 
instance of the superintendent of the respondent .. 
. l!pon the trial it was ·urged frequently ~ vehemently 
that no evidence could be admitted of the deliveries of over-
ages -and extras because this vio1ated the parole evidence 
rule. It \Vas urged further that the parole evidence rule 
precluded such evidence because of what counsel denomi-
nated the '~package methodt' of bil1ing on orders such as 
here involved. Counsel for respondent apparently takes 
the view that under these contracts a:ppeilant w~L~ to pro-
vide all materials required for the houses and therefore 
he could not introduce such evidence because it varied the 
terms of the contract .. 
Respondent further took the view that Mr~ C. E. Sla-
vens!' corporate superintendent, had no authority to waive 
any provision~ alter, or amend the written contracts.. It 
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\Vas further urged that in vie\\' of the fact that lien waivers 
had been signed by the appellant~ he could not now assert 
claim for any materials. That ist respondent's view was 
that ·appellant could put on no evidence calculated to ex-
plain the lien waivers. We believe this defines the issues. 
We shall assume that the trial court granted the nonsuit 
on all issues4 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT BY ITS CONlDUCT WAIVED THE 
(X)NTRAGr REQillREMENT THAT ADDITIONS OR 
DELETIONS IN THE ldA.TERIALS TO BE FURNISHED 
\VERE TO BE MADE IN \VRITING~ OR IT IS ES. 
TOPPED TO SO ASSERT, AND EVIDENCE ON THIS 
POINT DOES NOT VIOLATE THE PAROLE EVIDENCE 
RULE .. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTtS AGENT~ C. E. SLAVENS~ HAD 
ACTUAL OR APPARENT AUTHORITY TO WAIVE, AL.-
TER OR CHANGE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CON-
TRACTS. 
POINT III 
THlE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS ARE FOR THE DE-
LIVERY OF SPECIFIED AMOUNTS OF NAMED MA-
TERIALS AKD EVIDENCE OFFERED AND ADI\IIT-
TED TO SHOW OTHERWISE VIOLATES TilE PAROLE 
EVIDENCE RULE. 
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POINT IV 
THE LIEN WAIVERS, FOR PURPOSES OF TinS 
ACI'ION, ARE IviERE RECEIPTS AND EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE. MAY PROPERLY BE ADMI'ITED IN EX .. 
PLANATION THEREOF~ 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT BY ITS CONDUCT WAIVED TIIE 
CONTRACT REQUIREMENT THAT ADDITIONS OR 
DELETIONS IN THE MATERIALS TO BE FURNISHED 
~ TO BE MADE IN WRITING, OR IT IS ES-
TOPPED TO SO ASSERT~ AND EVIDENCE ON TillS 
POINT DOFS NOT VIOLATE THE PAROLE EVIDENCE 
RULE. 
As is shown in argument under Point II of this brief, 
appellant dealt with the 'COrporate respondent solely through 
its agentt C. E. Slavens. The authority of this gentlemen 
will be assumed for purpose of argument under this point. 
Concerning parole modifications in 'Written contracts 
requl.ring tftlat changes be 1n writingt the American Law 
Institute, Restatement of the Lal\" of Contracts. ·Section 
407 ~ states: 
'
1The fact that an agreement to rescind or modify 
a prior contract is oral does not render it inoperative 
e~t in the cases and to the extent that a Statute of 
Frauds requiresj under the rules stated in sections 222-
224, whether the prior contract is oral or is in a sealed 
or unsealed \Vriting. '' 
Comment (a) nnder this section states in part: '•When· 
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ever two persons contract, no limitations self-imposed can 
dest1·oy their power to contract again.'' We believe this is 
good la \\~ and that it prevails in this jurisdiction. Salzner v. 
Jos. G. Snell Estate Corp.t 81 Utah 111~ 16 P. 2d 9284 
The contracts (Exh4 6-11) contain es~ntially the same 
provision: 
'
1 It is mutually agreed that any additions or de-
letions in the materials to be furnished are to be given 
m vniting by Party of the Second Part to the First 
Party, and the value of the changesp based upon prices 
quoted in the at. t.c.u:heu lists, shall either be added or 
subtracted from the original contract. t, 
When appellant learned that more and different ma-
terials were being ordered and delivered than v.ras providoo 
in the materials lists as parts of the contracts, he immedi-
ately contacted the superintendent of respondent, Mr. C. 
E. Slavens (Tr~ 351-3). \\,.e quote from the record: 
'~Q. In July of 1957, you say you sent a statment 
to Payne & Day, Inc., through Mr. Slavens? 
A~ We sent it to Mr. Slavens~ addressed to Payne 
and Day, yes. 
Q. I show you what is 1narked as Plaintiffs Ex-
hibit 19 and ask you if that is the statement which was 
~nt? 
A. That is the one that was sent, yes. 
Q. And in response to that biUingt did you have 
nny conversation with JVh\ Slavens? 
A. j\1r. Slavens carne in the office. 
(Objection and argument} 
Q~ Where did it take place? 
""A... In o.u r office. 
Q. Who \Vas present? 
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g· 
A. Mrs. Davis, myselfJ and I am not sure whether 
Clyde was there or not. 
Q. Tell us what was said by Mr. Slavens and what 
was said by you and any other persons ·participating 
in the conversation~ 
(Objections and argument) 
A. Mr. Slavens ~brought in the invoice with him. 
Q. You are referring to the exhibit? 
A Exhibit 19.. Ylhen he came in,. he showed it 
tn me. He said~ ''John, if you send that to Payne and 
DayJ they would not have anything to do with it, they 
would not know what the contract is and if you send 
them ta them~ it will ball them up. What we want to 
do is koop a record.'' How nice it would be, he sug-
gested, a little record kept day by day and at the com-
pletion of the job, we would go through and take the 
creclits and debits and come up with the difference and 
he would get a oheck and that is the reason Payne and 
Day was not billed by the month~'~ 
See also Transcript of Trial, 28-29~ 304·5. 
Appellant, when he discovered additional and different 
materials were being ordered, attempted to get in touch 
with the corporate officers~ but without success (Tr. 299, 
340). He was then assured by Mr. Slavens that the latter 
had the authority, unless Payne called Davis, and that ev .. 
erything was '•okeh.t~ TrueJ the trial court ordered this 
stricken, on the theory that it was an attempt to prove 
agency by the declarations of the agent We submit that 
this was e.ITOr, as the agency of Slave-ns was never in dis-
pute~ only the extent of his authority as agent This is 
treated with authorities in Point II .. 
After the contracts, with material lis~ were entered 
into, the plans of the houses were changed ( Tr.. 61) .. Two 
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houses \Ve're increased in size without notice to appellant 
(Tr. 199~ 201, 350). Porch oolwnn.s, a su·bstantial item not 
on the contract material lists, and not shown on planst were 
added by :vir. Payne and Mr. Day and provided by appe1-
lant. at Mr.. Slavens' order ( Tr. 186-7) . WindO\V sills also 
were added (Tr~ 187). Slavenst who had an immediate 
interest in keeping the prices dCAVn (See Exh/s 20-22) even 
priced the cost of adding porch columns and passed this in· 
formation on to Mr. Payne and I\lr. Day (Tr .. 187). 
Many items were simply 'forgotten'' by Mrr Slavens 
when he dra\v the material lists, part of the contracts. Roof ... 
ing felt was used for subfloors in kitchens, baths and ga-b1e 
ends of all frame housest on order of Slavenst though it 
was not on the material Hsts (Tr. 166) 4 Wa1ls of the houses 
were of sheetrock 1 substantial quantities of sheet rock nails 
\Vere ordered from appellant, yet these were left out in the 
material lists because Slavens Hforgot" (Tr. 193).. The 
same is true of rabetted \Vindow sills (Tr .. 181) t robinet 
hinges (Tr. 193) t door hinges (Tr. 195), though these were 
on the original plans and specifications, prepared by Sla-
vensr Exhi~bit 23 sho\VS what Slavens considered as re-
Qllired to enlarge the two houses after commencement of 
the project and the execution of the contracts by appellants. 
This shows su:bstantial additiona'l materialsj but appellant 
knew nothing of the enla 1·g t7ment until after the fact, when 
respondent ran o"Ut of roofing material (Tr. 80) ~ After con-
struction was under way respondent had difficulties \Vi.th 
F~H~A. and was required to u-se additional steel in footings 
(Tr. 229ff) ~ 
The trial court steadfastly refused to allow appellant 
lo testify to a conversation with Mr. Slavens \Vhen appel-
lant learned of the use oi additional and different materials~ 
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in. which Slavens assured appellant that a Vlritten change 
order would not be required (See opening statement, Tr. 6--
7}. The court~s reason stated was that we were attepting 
to prove agency by declarations of the agent. This~ we 
submit~ was error. Our attempt was to show the extent 
of authority of an admitted agent~ and testimony sought 
was part of the res gest.ae. Slavens, respondent's agmt, 
who profited with respondent by seeing that appellant 
was not paid for extras and overages, did~ h&..Vever, admit 
such conversation (Tr. 224). 
The project. was a large one-to build sixty-one houses 
in one season. We respec1Ifully submit that the entire rec-
ord shows one concern only on part of respondent, to get 
the job done. That it paid no attention to the contract re--
quirement in issue. That it, through its agent, simply or-
dered and picked up additional materials as needed, as con .. 
struction progressed and as changes in plans were made, 
and that it thereby waived~ or is estopped to assert,. the 
contract requirement that changes in material lists be made 
in lVriting. See Salzner v .. Jos.. G .. Snell Esta.te Corp .. t 81 Utah 
111~ 16 P. 2d 928; Fra.nk T. Hickey v. Los Angeles Jewish 
Community Councilt et al, 276 P. 2d 52, ...... Cal ....... ; 
Si tkin et al v. Smith et al, 276 Pac. 521~ r • • • • ~Ariz. . _. r • 
The record is replete with objections and arguments 
that the admission of testimony concerning transactions 
and conversations foUowing the entry into the contracts 
and during construction was violative of the parole -evidence 
rule.. That rule precludes extrinsic evidence of transactions 
pri.o.r to or oontemporanous with execution of an unambig· 
uous written contract, intended to vary its terms. We sub· 
mit that we offered no such evidence~ though, as argued un· 
der Point III of this brief, respondent did just that. \Ve 
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have consistently admitted the delivery of and payment for 
the materials listed in the "\Vritten contract, and make no 
claim therefor. We continue to maintain that a provision 
of those written contracts was waived, or that a separate 
and distinct contract or contracts were made, or that re-
spondent~ by its conduct-. is estopped to deny othenvise, 
and that appellant is entitled to payment for overages and 
extras ordered by respondent. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT~S AGENT~ C. E. SLAVENS, HAD 
ACTIJAL OR APPARENT AU'TIIORITY TO WAIVE~ AL-
TER OR CHANGE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CON-
TRACTS. 
Numerous and lengthy were arguments on the trial 
that Slavens ·held a position of.limited authority!' which did 
not extend to waiving a provision of the written contract, 
or ordering additional or different materials. He was called 
''constiu-ction superintendent,'' whtcht it ·seems was alone 
considerro as such limitation~ His contracts of employ-
ment (Exh~'s 20~ 21j 22) were introouced to shmv such limi-
tation~ which~ we submit~ they do not. 
Appellant and his agents dealt solely with the corpo-
rate agent Slavensj and never with the o.ffieers~ Payne o-r· 
Day (Tr. 77~ 79t 100-102, 103-104~ 114, 120-21~ 147-149~ 
283-4). Slavens drew the contracts between appellant and 
respondent (Tr. 388). Slavens drew or had drawn the plans 
and specifications for the houses ( Tr. 426-'Xl) , but these 
\Ve-r-e not made availalll~ to appellant prior to his bidding 
and signing the material contracts (Tr. 80, 178). Slavens 
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12 
prepared the ·material listst part of the written contract.s 
(Tr. 178). (See also Tr. 426ff). 
Alppellant was never informed of Slavens, contracts of 
employment or any limitation on his authority (Tr. 425-6). 
These contracts (Exh.js 20-22) bear examination. They 
recite that Slavens, called the General Construction Super-
intendentJ His experienced in the building of houses and in 
preparing the initial building program and construction 
estimates for the construction of numerous ~houses .. ' ' They 
then provide that ·he will proceed to over_se.e and supervise 
construction of the houses, but will not devote his full time 
the-reto.. He '"agrees to proceed expeditiously, in a work-
manlike manner, to com-plete the construction'J of the hou-
ses.. A detailed statement of his compensation is then spelled 
out, followed by the most interesting provision-that he 
will participate to the amount of half the savings to the 
extent he can hold the prices of the houses below a named 
~he was to share in the profit made by keeping sub-
contractors' and materiahnen~s payments dc:wm.~ Nothing 
further appears defining or limiting his authority~ or grant-
ing him the authority he proceeded to assume~ 
On his own testimony, Slavens drew or provided the 
plans~ prepared the material lists, dre\V the contracts with 
subcontractors, negotiated the contracts, supeiVised con-
struction, delivered the payments, prepared the lien waivers 
and collected them '"-01hen signed~ and generally ~"ran the 
show/' (Tr. 428-30). We quote the record {Tr. 431): 
"Q. As a matter of fact~ you (Slavens) did all of 
the dealings in connection with this project with Mr. 
Davis on behalf of Payne and Day, did you not? 
A. So far as I know, yes~ 
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Q. Because you were in charge of the entire pro-
ject~ were you not? 
A. I was construction superintendent. 
Q. Of the entire project? 
A. Of the entire project~ yes4 
Q. And your job was to get the houses built! 
A. Yes."~ 
As a matter of fact, Slavens was at appeUant•s -place 
of business almost daily (Tr. 197, 221), at which time he 
would pi-ck up or order materials (Tr. 79~ 259). 
During direct examination of appellantt we Wldertook 
to show that the agent, Slavens, made representations to 
appellant as to the extent of his authority4 When appel-
lant Davis learned that two houses had been increased in 
size after he had contraeted with respondent~ he endeavored 
to get in touch with Mr. Payne or Mr~ Day. We quote from 
the transcript (Tr. 299) : 
"Q. (The Court) You say you called Mr. Payne 
for the purpose to see who \Vas authorizing the bigger 
house? 
A. And to get authorization. 
Q. (By :Mr. Ivins) to go ahead? 
Q. (By Mr. Ivins) Did you get ahold of Mr. 
Payne? 
A. No. 
Q. Why did you disconti-nue trying to get ahold 
of him? 
A. Mr4 Slavens told me) J.~r have the complete au-
thority to go ahead~ If Mr~ Payne don't get in touch 
\Vi.th you in an hour, you can figure everything is 
okey.t, 
Q. Did he get in touch with you? 
A~ I never heard from l\11~ + J;layne at all. t' 
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The trial COW't ordered this stricken as an attempt to 
prove extent of authority of the agent by his own state-
ment. 
At the commencement of the transaction, appellant 
began billing Payne & Day~ Inc. for extras and overages 
(Tr .. 158). 1\1r. Slavens brooght the billing back to appel· 
lant and a conversation was had between him and appel-
lant, the substance of which the trial court refused to ad-
mit~ on the ground it was an attempt to prove agency by 
tatements of the agent. A proffer of proof was made (Tr. 
163) that :Mr. Slavens returned the billm.g, and instructed 
appellant to keep track of the extras and overages lUltil 
·oompletion of the project, at which time they w~d settle 
up as Slavens had done on prior -projects~ for the reason 
that billings as extras and overages were delivered would 
confuse Mr. Payne and Mr~ Day.. See also Transcriptt 455-
457. 
We respectfully submit that the trial rourt committed 
error in excluding sucll evidence. There never was a ques~ 
tion but that Slavens was agent of the corporation. The 
issue raised was the extent of his authority~ and appellant's 
notice of any ·purported limitation~ We respectfully sub-
mit that such declarations of the agent were admissi·ble as 
part of the res gestae--they were part of the act for which 
he was agent of the corporate respondent. Park v. Moor-
man Mfg. Co. et aJ.t --·~-Utah , 241 P. 2d 914; 
2 1\-lecham on Agency (2d Ed.) p. 1353) Sec .. 1780; I Jones 
on· Evidence (4th Ed~) 487 ~ Sec.. 256; A. L~ I.. 1«-sta.tement 
of the Law on Agency, Seer 284. 
We re:spect.fu1ly submit that on these facts~ Slavens 
had apparent authority to bind the co-rporate respondent~ 
either on a theory of waiver of the require1nent of the con-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
tracts that changes be in writing. on a theory that-the ex .. 
tras and overages were in fact a new ·contractt in the nature 
of an open aocowtt ~or a theory that the respondent prin ... 
ciple is estopped to deny its agentts authority to bind it. 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in the case of Union Cen-
tury Life A~~urance Co. v. Glasscock, 110 SW 2d. 6811 270 
Ky. 750, 114 ALR 373, has stated well our position: 
"If one ·puts another into, or knowingly permits 
him to occupyt a JX)S.ition in which, according to the 
ordinary experience and habits of mankind, it is usual 
for the occupant to have authority of a particular kind~ 
anyone having occasion to deal with one in that po-
si lion is justified in inferring that the person in ques-
tion possesses such authorityt Wlless the contrary is 
then made knOWTI.'' 
See also 1 Me-eham on Agency (2d. Ed.) 174 .. 178~ Sec. 
241·245, and page 215, Sec. 298; A .. L. I. Restatement of the 
Law of Agency Sec. 81 49, 50~ 141. 
We believe the record shows that Slavens had actual 
authority to thus waive the provisions of the contract and 
bind his ·corporate principal for the extras and overages. 
Appellant also had contracts with respondent for the roof .. 
ing of the same sixty-one houses involved (Tr. 289) (Exh.'s 
26-29) . Two of the houses were increased in size after 
appellant had executed t..l-te contracts in issue~ necessitat-
ing more roofing materialst \Vhich were ordered orally by 
Slavens, without written an1endment to the contracts. The· 
roofing was delivered by appellant. and \vas ·paid for by 
Payne and Day, Inc. on Slavens' authority, still without 
\\·Titten ordert though the contracts for roofing and those 
for other materials were identical in requiring such writ-
te'l1 authority {Tr. 289-294) + \Vhat more evidencej apart 
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from an absolute admission by the corporation~ need one 
have as to tlhe extent of Slavens~ authority? 
POINT m 
THE ORIGINAL CONTRACTS ARE FOR THE DE· 
LIVERY OF SPECIFIED AMOUNTS OF N.A..MED MA· 
TER!IALS AND EVIDENCE OFFERED AND ADMIT-
TED TO SHOW OTHERWISE VIOLATES THE PAROL.~£ 
EVIDENCE RULE .. 
Throughout the bial counsel for res{Xlndent held forth 
extensively on what he denominated the ''package'~ method 
of bidding materials for houses.. Over our objectiont re-
spondent was pennitted to go beyond the scope of our di-
rect examination, and interrogate Slavens extensively on 
his interpretation of the contract on this iXilitt (Tr. 289ft}. 
It seems that according to his theory~ appellant was merely 
to furnish all materials needed for the housest and that the 
material listst part of the contracts~ are a sort of guide--
a sort of norm, both as to kind and amount~ the only limi-
tation being something in the nature of the ejusdem gen· 
eris rule.. Appellant was not to provide materials for floor-
ing, cement work, brick, painting, and the likeJ hut except 
for that he was to deliver whatever Slavens and his prin ... 
cipal wanted, though plans could be changed from day to 
day~ 
Perhaps respondent was relying on what it considered 
a practice of the trade~ If so, this is strange~ COWlsel for 
respondent said, '~It is an expJanation of a system that was 
used~ that we don't see used very often in the business.'' 
(Tr. 389). Slavens denied knowledge of its general use 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
( Tr.. 433) . No evidence of business custom. or practice was 
offered .. 
If it had been~ it 'vould be objectionab1e. We submit 
that the contracts are plaint unambigu.ous~ and require no 
explanation by extrinsic evidence4 Except for Exhj.bits 6 
and 10 ~ the contracts provide that '~First Party (appellant) 
agrees to furnish materials~' for the identified houses Has 
per attached lists,' which become a part of this agreement.~' 
Exhibits 6 and 10 add the following: "'It is Wlderstood that 
this is an average price, and the fact is taken into consider-
ation that scheme 2 has one more truss than the other 
schemes, and that scheme 1 and 2 do not have 20x10x16 
or 2 pieces 2x4x10 barge rafters L'lat are on the lists." That 
is~ in those instances where there is a variation in construc-
tion from the genet"dl plan) this is covered in the contracts 
themselves~ 
The lists are broken into two sections~ denominated 
package 1 and package 2. The record shrnvs that package 
1 was supposed to be what was required from appellant to 
take the houses to an inspectic;.n stage, and package 2 \Va:; 
supposed to be what was required from appellant to take 
the houses to final inspecticm. The only other use of the 
term package in the contracts is: ''It is understood that 
delivery will be made and biUed by ilackage nrnnber per 
attached lists~'~ ( en1phas.is added) That is, the term ''pack-
age~t \\'as used in the contract ·simply to control delivery and 
bHling. We see no ambiguity, 
The material lists specify fixed quantities of named 
materials. Ap~llant did not conb·act to provide all mate-
rials needed to build the ·houses, or all materials needed to 
brlng . them to ar.Ly inspection stage~ Had the materials 
bc:-t: n des t.r { }yed,. stolen j or o the 1"\V ise disposed of after de~ 
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liveryJ that was no concern of appellant. We submit that 
the contracts are clear and wtambiguous. No explanation 
of what was meant was needed~ none should have been ad-
mitted, and the court erred in permitting Slavens to go on 
extensively about his own peculiar -&'package~~ theory, 
thought upt we suspect, after the fact. It was error to per-
mit Slavens to testify as to his intentions.. Continental 
Bank & Trust Co~ v Bybee et aL 6 Utah 2d. 98J 306 P2d. 773; 
Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 Utah 475, 25 P2d. 
952; 2 Jones on E\idence (4th Ed.) 869~ Sec. 454J 460, 462-
6 .. 
POINT IV 
THE LIEN WAIVERS, FOR PURPOSES OF THIS 
ACTION, ARE l\iERE RECEIPTS AND EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE MAY PROPERLY BE ADMITTED IN EX-
PLANATION TIIEREOF. 
It is remembered that the contracts) Exhibits 6 to llt 
contained material lists, setting forth specific quantities of 
specific items:~ broken into two groups~ denominated pack-
age one and package two. These materials listed in the 
written contracts were to be billed for according to this di-
vision. That is1 when the materials listed in what is called 
package one were delivered, they were to be billed for as 
a unit, and were to be paid for as such. This was follO"Ned, 
and no question arises thereon. 
At the time of payment lien waivers were signed by 
appellants ( Exhi1bits 12~ 16) .. These lien waivers were pre-
pared by Mr. Slavens) and insisted on by him before pay-
ment, in order to continue "With the bank financing (Tr~ 
430-:11). Mr. Clyde Davis testified to executing these~ and 
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e"<plained that they were for the materials 1isted on the 
written con tracts only (Tr ~ 91) . 
One of the grounds for· the motion far non .. suit. was 
that the appellant '~has receipted the defendant (respond-
ent) as having been paid in full" (Tr. 478; R .. 26). We 
take it that this is based upon these lie-n waivers, 
This is not a lien foreclOsure action.. It is brought to 
re-cover for materials delivered for which appellant has not 
been paid. The record amply shmvs that the overages and 
extras were in fact deliveredt and that they were not paid 
for. Davis has brought suit for the extras and overages, 
and Slavens testified that appellant has been paid nothing 
but the contract sums (Tr. 451). On motion for non-suit 
these facts should be deemed true.. For ·purposes of this 
action! the lien waivers are a receipt merely, and they are 
explained as a receipt for the materials called for in the ma-
terial lists, part of the "Wlitten contract-..~materials for 
which we have never sought payment in this action. Most 
of them recite: ~This Payment Covers Materialt Package 
0ro. 1 (or No.· 2t as the case may be).'"' thus being expressly 
restricted to the material lists~ although some recite mere-
ly: '~This Payment Covers Material~ Payment in Full.~' On 
these latter it is noted that t11ere is only one lien release, 
though the contract calls for delivery in t\vo separate pack-
ages~ to ~ bi11ed separa teiy. 
We quote from 2 Jones on Evi<len!'e (4th Ed.) p. 936. 
s~. 491: 
HThe rule e-xcluding testimony which is offe-red 
for the purpose of contradicting, varying or explaining 
the terms of a \·__.~r itt en instrument may not be success-
fully invoked \V here the \vt·iting in dispute· constitutes 
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a mere receipt which does not em;body or set forth the 
term.s of a contract~., 
This court has so held in the case of Brixen v. Jorgen. 
sen et at, 33 Utah 97, 92 Pac. 1004, wherein it was held 
that the contract to sell realty, in so far as it recited the 
amount remaining tmpaid upon its execution, was only a 
receipt~ and that parole vidence was admissible to show 
that the amOW1t actually received was less than that stated 
If the trial court relied on these lien leases as the basis 
for the non,.suit, we respectfully submit that it committed 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
On the record as it now stands there can be no ques-
tion but that appellant delivered to respondent materials 
m addition to and different from that called for in the con-
tracts, to the value of 87J751.79~ for which he bas not been 
paid. He did so in gCXMi faith. on the representations of the 
only agent of respondent with whom he ever dealt that he 
would be paid. 
Apparently no one gave any attention to the provision 
in the contract that changes must be in writing. Plans 
were changed from time to time~ as the occasion aroset with-
out consulting or even informing appellant Because of the 
manner of delivery in bulkt 'With numerous hol.l.SeS going 
up at once, appellant had no way of kno\ving what was be-
ing used until after the faet. 
We submit that the corporate agent Slavens had act-
ual authority to waive the provisions requiring written chan .. 
ges in rna teria:l 1ists, that if he did not:P the corporation, by 
placing hi·m in full corrunand~ clothed him with apparent 
authortty, that he by his declarations and conduct waived 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
21 
the requirementt and that the corporation is estopped to 
deny such fact. The corporation entered into a profit 
sharing arrangement with Slavens and hlrned him loose 
to hold payments to those in appellant's position to a mini.-
mtuiL It does not nO'W lie in the corporate mouth to deny 
his acts. It is unconscionable that the corporation thus 
profit. We respectfully submit that the trial court erred 
in granting the non-suit~ and should be reversed. 
Respectfully submittetl, 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN)" for 
YOUNG. YOUNG & SORENSEN 
Attorneys for Alppellant 
227 North University Avenuej 
Provo, Utah 
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